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Abstract 
Introduction 
Richer countries have lower child mortality (1). One of the constraints to development and therefore child survival 
in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) is shortage of capital and public revenues, yet more than $800 billion left the continent 
over the last 40 years as illicit financial flows (IFF), at the expense of both (2).  
Objectives 
This paper sets out to estimate the cost of illicit financial flows in terms of the amount of time it could take to 
reach the fourth Millennium Development Goal (MDG) in 34 African countries.  
Design  
We have calculated the percentage increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) if IFF were curtailed using IFF/GDP 
ratios. We applied the income (GDP) elasticity of child mortality to the increase in GDP to estimate the reduction in 
time to reach the fourth MDG in 34 African countries.   
Settings  
34 countries in SSA 
Main Outcome measures 
Reduction in time to reach the first indicator of the fourth MDG, under-five mortality rate in the absence of IFF 
Results 
We find that in the 34 SSA countries, six countries will achieve their fourth MDG target at the current rates of 
decline. In the absence of IFF, sixteen countries would reach their fourth MDG target by 2015 and there would be 
large reductions for all other countries.  
Conclusions 
This drain on development is facilitated by financial secrecy in other jurisdictions.  Rich and poor countries alike 
must stem the hemorrhage of illicit financial flows by taking decisive steps towards improving financial 
transparency.  
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Background 
The MDGs are eight development goals, agreed to by 189 countries in 2000. These goals provided the international 
community with a focus upon which to act. The fourth MDG is to reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, 
the under-five mortality rate. There are three indicators which are used to monitor progress towards the fourth 
MDG (3); these indicators are -   
4.1 Under five mortality rate 
4.2 Infant mortality rate 
4.3 Proportion of children aged 1 year who are immunised against measles 
As each country had different rates of mortality at baseline in 1990, each were set a different target to aim 
towards. However, the majority of countries in the SSA region are making insufficient progress to meet their target 
as indicated by their progress towards the first indicator, the under-five mortality rate (4).  
The capital coming into a country (or leaving it) may influence the child mortality rate, and therefore the 
fourth MDG indicators, by several pathways, see figure 1 for a schematic representation.  The most direct and 
arguably the most important is the impact on household income and thus the ability of the family to provide for 
their children. The second is that the amount of capital coming into a country will influence the amount of 
government revenue available to provide social goods such as healthcare, education, water and sanitation. This 
latter pathway may be modified either positively or negatively by factors such control of corruption and the 
effectiveness of a government. The degree of corruption in a government also influences the capital coming into a 
country as corruption deters foreign direct investment, which in turn will affect household income. Government 
effectiveness is important for the provision of water and healthcare whereas household income is more important 
for shelter, sanitation and education (5).  
Many countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) have experienced economic growth over the last decade 
despite a global downturn, but it remains the world’s least developed region; as a result the under-five mortality 
rate is still 
 
4 
 
 
Figure 1: IFF and pathway by which it may influence the three indicators of the fourth MDG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 per 1000 live births (6). Among the major constraints facing SSA’s development are acute shortages of capital 
for investment and for public expenditure (7,8), and despite its abundant natural resources and a recent boom in 
commodity prices, SSA still has an acute shortage of development finance (9). Although remittances and official 
development assistance (ODA) have increased in the new millennium, the financial gap to achieve meaningful 
development in SSA is wide, see Figure 2. The paradox is that SSA is a “net creditor” to the rest of the world (2),  
partially due to illicit financial flows (IFF): see box 1. IFF is an outflow of capital from a jurisdiction through illegal 
Country resources (GDP pc PPP) and 
its distribution 
Household resources: access to food 
shelter/education/sanitation/healthcare (including vaccinations 
(indicator 4.3) /water/information Resource allocation in home 
Child mortality including under-five mortality 
rate (indicator 4.1) and infant mortality rate 
(indicator 4.2) 
 
 
Government revenue 
Governance/control of corruption 
Government efficiency  
 
IFF (1-15% of GDP) 
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means. Though documented to be a longstanding problem (10), it has been escalating in magnitude in SSA in the 
last 10 years,  reportedly tripling between the 1990s and 2000s (2). In addition, a proliferation of tax breaks aimed 
at attracting foreign direct investment (11), tax evasion and avoidance by multinational companies (MNC),  
embezzlement of state wealth by political elites and illicit transfer of legitimately earned wealth results in lower 
tax revenue and thus fewer resources for government expenditure: see box 2. The scarcity of services and the 
burden of taxation is therefore felt by the less well off (2). The scale of IFF – which has constantly been higher in 
relation to foreign aid  for example – means that counter-measures should be considered as an important part of 
the fight against poverty (12).  
While it is acknowledged that IFF has social  consequences, including reduced expenditure on health, education 
and infrastructure (12), research has concentrated on the effects on economic growth and poverty. The aim of this 
paper is to provide an illustration of the human rather than the financial scale of the problem. It will always be 
challenging to relate upstream policies to downstream consequences. 
 
Figure 2  Scale of capital flows in and out of SSA in USD for all SSA (13) 
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Box 1. Definitions 
Illicit financial flows (IFF) are the unrecorded movement of capital out of a country in contravention of the 
regulations of that country (2). It occurs primarily through the economic motives of individuals and companies 
when foreign rate of return on an investment is superior to the domestic risk-adjusted rate of return (8).  
IFF includes legitimately earned capital that become illegitimate when it has been moved across borders to 
evade paying tax to the country of origin.  An important early study estimated that commercial tax evasion 
accounted for 60%-65% of total capital outflows, with around a third due to the laundering of the proceeds of 
crime, and a few percentage due to corruption (10).  
Transfer price manipulation may happen between related companies or between a parent and a subsidiary 
company. The prices of traded goods are manipulated to maximise profit to the company and minimise the tax 
paid (7). 
Tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning are legal methods to minimise the tax due. 
Tax evasion is the illegal non-payment of tax, often based on hiding (corporate or personal) assets and income 
from authorities. 
Secrecy Jurisdictions (a more precise term, used in preference to ‘tax havens’) are characterised not only by 
preferential tax treatment (typically low or zero tax rates) for non-residents and limited regulation, but 
importantly also by a lack of transparency (14). They allow wealthy individuals, large corporations and criminals 
to circumvent the financial regulations and criminal laws of other jurisdictions. The Financial Secrecy Index 
published by the Tax Justice Network ranks secrecy jurisdictions according to the extent of the secrecy they 
offer, and the scale of their contribution to global financial flows. The most important of the secrecy 
jurisdictions in the most recent release of the index are Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, the US 
and Hong Kong (15) 
Shell companies are companies whose ownership is hidden i.e. the name of the beneficial owner is not known. 
Typically the only names that are known are nominees; a nominee may front thousands of companies. Several 
thousand shell companies may be registered to one address located in secrecy jurisdictions (14). 
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GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) is the value of output produced in a country in a year divided 
by the country’s population, adjusted for exchange rate differentials. It is regarded as a measure of standards of 
living for a country’s population, suitable for international comparison - although it can be criticised for failing to 
take into account differences in the extent of inequality. 
Under-five mortality is the probability of dying before the 5
th
 birthday, expressed as the number of deaths per 
one thousand live births and is considered one of the best single measures of a population’s health status 
(16,17).  
 
Box 2. What is known about this subject? 
Over the last 41 years it is estimated that US$814 billion of IFF left 31 countries in SSA (2).  
IFF from oil rich countries accounted for 72% of all IFF (2). 
It has been estimated that Transfer Price Manipulation alone costs SSA $34 billion each year, which is more than 
the continent receives in bilateral aid (9).  
The detrimental impacts of IFF includes reduced economic growth and retarded poverty reduction (12,18,19), as 
well as the undermining of governance and state-citizen relationships (18).  
Poverty reduction in Africa would have been 4% to 6% higher annually than the current 2.7% annual rate of 
reduction in the absence of IFF, between 2000 and 2007. This would have enabled most African countries to 
reach MDG1 of halving poverty by 2015 (2). 
It has been estimated that tax evasion through trade mispricing will cost 5.6 million under-five deaths in the 
developing world between 2000 and 2015 (20).  
 
However we need to try and do this in order to move beyond the current paradigm, where northern countries 
treat the symptoms of poverty with aid but do not address their polices which may contribute to it (21).   
Objectives:  
To estimate the cost of IFF in terms of the additional time required to reach MDG 4 for 34 countries in SSA 
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Capital flows in and out of SSA 
Capital flows in and out of SSA occur in the categories shown in table 1.  
How multinational corporations avoid paying tax 
IFF involves tax avoidance or evasion, generally using transfer price manipulation.  This is the deliberate over- or 
under-invoicing of the prices of products (goods, services, and intangibles) that are traded  
Table 1: Nature of capital flows and financial transfers from and to SSA  
In Out  
Foreign Direct Investment* Outward direct investment 
Foreign portfolio investment* Outward portfolio investment 
Aid/grants*  
Loans Debt repayments* 
 Illicit Financial Flows* 
*Included in figure 1 
among the parent and affiliates of a multinational corporation (MNC), typically in order to shift profits out of high-
tax jurisdictions into low-tax jurisdictions (7). This is an important conduit for IFF as it is estimated that almost 50% 
of global trade is between related parties. Low tax jurisdictions, often described as secrecy jurisdictions or tax 
havens, provide the means for companies to undertake this activity. A study by the US Congressional Research 
Service found that 43% of the overseas profits of US multinationals arose in just five secrecy jurisdictions, 
responsible for only 4% of the multinationals’ overseas workforce and 7% of their overseas investment (22). 98% 
of the largest companies on the London Stock Exchange have subsidiaries in tax havens; eighty-two operate in the 
developing world (23). 
The ways to estimate illicit financial flows 
Precise estimation of IFF is particularly difficult not only because of the differences as to its definition, but also 
because IFF data is – by definition – hidden, and hence not recorded in official statistics. Researchers have had to 
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develop proxy measures to estimate the magnitude of IFFs but all of these measures are limited by the data 
available (24).  The two most widely used are the World Bank residual model and Trade Mispricing model. The 
Residual method (World Bank, 1985) uses the difference between the recorded sources of funds and the use of 
funds. It captures tax evasion, theft and bribery, but does not capture trade mispricing. The Trade Mispricing 
model is based on the Directions of Trade Statistics has been developed to capture trade miss-invoicing. In this 
model, exports of goods as reported by the exporting country are compared with imports reported by the 
importing country after adjusting for the cost of insurance and freight (2). Several researchers combined these 
techniques and their variants to estimate IFF.  
 
The magnitude of IFF in SSA 
Two studies provide minimal estimates of IFF for SSA.  One study estimates that SSA lost US$854 billion from 1970 
to 2008 in illicit capital flows (13), with more than half of the total occurring in the period 2000 -2008. The other 
estimates that SSA lost US$814 billion from 1970 to 2010, of which US$202 billion were lost between the year 
2005 and 2010 (2). The magnitude of IFF from Africa has increased from $17 billion annually in the 1990s to $50 
billion per year since 2000, the latter period coinciding with increased economic growth on the continent (12).  
Data sources 
Data on IFF were obtained from the Global Financial Integrity (GFI) database (25). Estimates of the magnitude of 
illicit clandestine activity are of necessity imprecise, but are likely biased downwards hence under-estimated. Data 
on GDP is from the World Bank (26) and under–five mortality rates are from the 2012 countdown report (4). 
Method 
IFF/GDP ratios were obtained from Global Financial Integrity for 34 countries in SSA for which there was data 
available, (see column 5 of table 2). These ratios represent lost resources as a percentage of GDP, the corollary of 
which being the increase in GDP a country would have realized had IFF not occurred.   
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A meta-analysis has found that a 1% increase in income per capita is associated with a 0.45% decline in under–five 
mortality rate in developing countries when there no adjustment made for other variables (27). This relationship or 
elasticity is slightly weaker for SSA at -0.38 (95%CI -0.43 to -0.33) and we used the estimate for SSA (28). We 
assumed that the relationship between the percentages of GDP lost through IFF and therefore gained if IFF 
completely curtailed, would have had the same impact on child mortality as the remainder of the GDP. Using the 
IFF expressed as a percentage of GDP and the relationship between changes in income per capita and declines in 
under-five mortality rate, we calculated the potential extra annual rate of decline in under –five mortality in the 
absence of IFF.   We used the under-five mortality rates in 2000 (4) as the baseline rates and compared the 
number of years it would take to reach the MDG target for each country using the actual annual rate of reduction 
between 2000 -2011 (29)  and the rate of reduction which could have been attained in the absence of IFF.  
To calculate the number of years it would take to reach the MDG at the current rate of decline we used the 
equation
nrPF )1(  . Where F (future) is the under-five mortality rate target as set for the MDG for that 
country, P (present) is the under-five mortality rate in 2000; r is the rate of decline in under-five mortality rate, n is 
the number of years.  We then calculated the number of years it would take to reach the MDG target for each 
country using the same formula in the presence of the extra decline in under –five mortality rate which could be 
realized in the absence of IFF.  
Results 
The number of years it will, and could take to reach MDG 4 targets is given in the last two columns. A country is 
taken as being able to reach its target if this figure is fifteen years or less, i.e. the target reached by 2015. The 
results suggest that only six of these SSA countries would achieve their MDG 4 target at the current rates of 
decline. If IFF were completely curtailed, this number would increase to 16 countries. Even those countries that 
would not achieve their targets, they would be able to achieve the target in a substantially shorter period in the 
absence of IFF. 
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Table 2: The potential reduction in the number of years required to reach MDG 4 
 
Country 2000 
under-five 
mortality 
rates (per 
1000) 
MDG 4 
target 
(under-
five 
mortality 
rate) 
Actual 
annual 
reduction 
in under-
five 
mortality 
rates 
(2000-
2011) 
Illicit 
financial 
flows 
(%of 
GDP) 
Overall 
potential 
annual 
reduction 
in U5M in 
the 
absence 
of IFF  
The 
number of 
years from 
2000  to 
reach 
MDG at 
current 
rates of 
decline 
The 
number of 
years from 
2000  to 
reach 
MDG if 
‘IFF/GDP’ 
curtailed 
Angola 200 87 2.0 7 4.66 41 17 
Botswana 96 17 10.4 10 14.20 16 11 
Burkina Faso 191 67 2.0 3 3.14 52 33 
Burundi 164 63 1.5 6 3.78 63 25 
Cameroon 148 50 0.8 6 3.08 135 35 
Central African 
Republic* 
176 59 0.5 5 2.40 218 45 
Chad 190 67 1.0 20 8.60 104 12 
Congo, DR 181 66 0.7 3 1.84 144 54 
Congo, Rep 104 35 0.9 25 10.40 120 10 
Cote d'Ivoire 148 51 1.7 6 3.98 62 26 
Ethiopia 141 70 5.3 6 7.58 13 9 
Gabon 88 31 2.1 11 6.28 49 16 
Gambia 128 55 2.6 14 7.92 32 10 
Ghana 99 39 2.2 2 2.96 42 31 
Guinea 175 76 2.8 9 6.22 29 13 
Guinea Bissau 177 80 1.3 7 3.96 61 20 
Kenya 111 35 4.0 1 4.38 28 26 
Lesotho 127 34 2.8 15 8.50 46 15 
Madagascar 102 56 4.8 6 7.08 12 8 
Malawi 167 75 6.2 10 10.00 13 8 
Mali 213 83 1.8 3 2.94 52 32 
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Mauritania 116 43 0.5 12 5.06 198 19 
Mozambique 177 83 4.7 5 6.60 16 11 
Niger 218 102 5.0 3 6.14 15 12 
Nigeria 186 77 3.8 12 8.36 23 10 
Rwanda 177 58 11.1 5 13.00 9 8 
Senegal 119 50 6.4 1 6.78 13 12 
South Africa 78 19 4.2 4 5.72 33 24 
Sudan 114 41 1.7 3 2.84 60 35 
Swaziland 114 28 0.9 11 5.08 155 27 
Tanzania 130 52 5.7 2 6.46 16 14 
Togo 124 50 1.4 6 3.68 64 24 
Uganda 144 62 4.1 3 7.52 20 16 
Zambia 157 57 5.6 9 5.60 18 11 
Total 146 56 3.3  3.31 29 16 
 
Discussion  
Statement of principal findings 
In IFF had been completely curtailed from the year 2000, the first indicator of the fourth MDG could have been 
reached in sixteen of the 34 SSA countries which we studied. This compares to six countries at the current rates of 
decline. Since IFF are hidden, their magnitude is likely under-estimated and that the IFF figures are conservative, it 
is probably that curtailing IFF would have resulted in many more countries achieving their targets. 
We assumed that that illicitly removed GDP would have the same association with child mortality as official GDP. 
Two main channels can be envisaged as underpinning this relationship:  
(1) Higher GDP implies higher (household) incomes which in turn are associated with lower child mortality 
(30).  
(2) Higher GDP implies higher tax revenues (both in absolute terms and proportional to GDP), and this may be 
associated with increased social spending, depending on factors such as government efficiency and 
government control of corruption. 
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IFF may not derive homogenously from the population, and links to general household income may be tenuous. On 
the other hand, a unit of IFF is more likely to be taxable than a unit of GDP (since not all GDP is taxable while IFF 
are largely motivated by the desire to escape taxation). It could also be argued that even if capital remained 
domestic the same rate of income tax may not be paid for the rest of the economy, as generally corporations incur 
lower income tax. However in Africa corporate income tax was on average 44% in 1990, only falling to 33% in 2005 
(7).  On balance, assuming the same elasticity for hypothetically recovered ‘IFF GDP’ as for official GDP does not 
seem likely to create a predictable distortion in our mortality estimates and particularly bearing in mind the 
estimates for IFF are already very conservative. 
Strengths and weakness of the study 
This is the first estimate of the impact of IFF on the time taken to reach the fourth MDG for countries in SSA.  
We have not provided a full, causal model of the relationship between IFF and child mortality. However the 
percentage of GDP lost through IFF is established, and of the same order of magnitude from several sources. The 
relationship between GDP and child mortality has been established by a meta-analysis and we have used an 
estimate of the elasticity or relationship which is specific for SSA.  
Implications for policy makers and future research 
Most countries in SSA have experienced strong economic growth over the last decade, and tax revenues represent 
an increasing share of GDP of around 20% in Africa as a whole (31). However, around half of SSA countries still 
mobilize less than the 20% considered necessary to reach the MDGs (11). Taxation provides governments with the 
funds needed to provide public services  (11). Governments raise 10 times more income through taxes than they 
receive in aid (23) and aid may even discourage recipients from developing their domestic tax regime (11). Aid 
which could support the development of a partner country’s tax base only attracts 0.01% of ODA each year (11).  
A considerable number of African countries have large supplies of natural resources and there has been a boom in 
the price of primary commodities over the last decade (9). This could represent an opportunity for child survival if 
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these resources are carefully stewarded. However, countries which are oil exporters have a higher IFF as a 
proportion of GDP than countries which do not export oil (12) and countries which trade commodities (particularly 
through  Switzerland) are exposed to illicit outflows through price distortions (32).  
The UN high level panel on the post-2015 development framework has recommended a global target to ‘Reduce 
illicit flows and tax evasion and increase stolen-asset recovery’ (33), which is a welcome recognition of the 
importance of the issue for development. What is lacking so far is a specific target for reduction, and a plan of 
action to achieve this. Both the G8 and G20 have relevant agenda in this area, and should prioritise the automatic 
exchange of tax information between countries, including the identification of companies, trusts and bank 
accounts owned by residents of other countries; and a requirement that multinational groups publish a combined 
report on their global activities, including a country by country breakdown (34).  
We hope this may galvanise policymakers to address the issue of illicit flows with greater urgency, including 
through greater international financial transparency. Future research could usefully estimate the pathways 
through which economic determinants of child mortality operate and more accurately model the impact of IFF on 
child mortality.  
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